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Abstract—Over the past decades, power systems have expe-
rienced drastic transformations in order to address the growth
in energy demand, reduce carbon emissions, and enhance power
quality and energy efficiency. This shift to the smart grid concept
involves, among others, the utilization of distributed energy
resources (DERs) such as rooftop solar panels and storage sys-
tems, contributing towards grid decentralization while improving
control over power generation. In order to seamlessly integrate
DERs into power systems, embedded devices are used to support
the communication and control functions of DERs. As a result,
vulnerabilities of such components can be ported to the industrial
environment. Insecure control networks and protocols further
exacerbate the problem. Towards reducing the attack surface,
we present an authentication scheme for DERs, DERauth, which
leverages the inherent entropy of the DER battery energy storage
system (BESS) as a root-of-trust. The DER authentication is
achieved using a challenge-reply mechanism that relies on the
corresponding DER’s BESS state-of-charge (SoC) and voltage
measurements. A dynamically updating process ensures that the
BESS state is up-to-date. We evaluate our proof-of-concept in
a prototype development that uses lithium-ion (li-ion) batteries
for the BESS. The robustness of our design is assessed against
modeling attacks performed by neural networks.
Index Terms—Distributed energy resources, authentication,
battery energy storage systems, power grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to North American Electric Reliability Cor-
poration (NERC), a distributed energy resource (DER) is
any resource on the distribution power grid that generates
electricity and is not otherwise included in the bulk electric
system [1]. DERs include microgrids, energy storage, behind-
the-meter generation, etc. The increasing amounts of DERs –
their generation capacity is expected to be 40GWs by 2030 [2]
– contribute towards the transformation of the energy infras-
tructure offering flexible control over power generation while
minimizing operating costs. Specifically, DERs with energy
storage (e.g., fuel cells, batteries, or flywheels) extend grid
reliability while efficiently addressing the balance between
real-time energy supply and demand. Battery energy storage
systems (BESS) contribute significantly to this balancing pro-
cess. Among different options, lithium-ion (li-ion) batteries
have become the dominant form for BESS installations due to
their high energy density, decreasing costs, and performance
characteristics [3].
In order to effectively monitor and control the operation
of DERs, DER plants involve both local communications
between the plant management system and DER units as
Fig. 1. Secure CRSeq authentication of DNP3-SA, a communications protocol
used between components in process automation and industrial systems.
well as between the plant and operators or aggregators who
“manage the DER plant as a virtual source of energy and an-
cillary services” [4]. The interconnection and interoperability
of DERs are enabled by protocols such as Modbus, DNP3,
and IEEE 2030.5. However, such interfaces do not typically
include any normative and overarching cybersecurity require-
ments. For example, Modbus and DNP3 have several identified
vulnerabilities [5]. The implementation of these protocols is
often enabled by legacy embedded systems developed without
security in mind. This is evident by the incidents against
the Ukrainian grid targeting embedded devices supporting
industrial communications [6], [7].
Towards addressing the aforementioned security issues,
several software and hardware approaches have been devel-
oped [8]. Most software-based monitoring techniques add
instrumented code into the original application [9]. Their
computing overhead, however, is too large to be deployed
in practice, especially in real-time applications [10], [11]. In
addition, software-based protocols can be exploited due to
implementation vulnerabilities, enabling network attacks or
even allow adversaries to disable the protocol communication
media [12].
Methods that utilize hardware as a root-of-trust can provide
a firm foundation from which to build security and trust
[13]. Hardware-assisted technologies include trusted platform
modules (e.g., Intel TXT), trusted execution environments
(e.g., ARM TrustZone), virtual isolation (e.g., Intel VT), cryp-
tographic acceleration (e.g., Intel AES-NI), random number
generation (RNG) (e.g., SRAM physical unclonable func-
tions – PUFs), etc. For instance, PUFs leverage the physical
properties of hardware devices to extract randomness ensur-
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Fig. 2. Overview of the communication configuration with DERauth between DER system operators and DER units.
ing unclonability, prediction infeasibility, and tamper-evident
properties.
In this paper, we present DERauth, a lightweight hardware-
based authentication scheme which can be implemented by
deployed embedded devices such as programmable logic con-
trollers and gateways (located at DERs and aggregators) and
serve as an add-on feature in existing protocols. DERauth
provides a secure method for plant and fleet operators, utilities,
retail energy providers, and aggregators to authenticate indi-
vidual DER systems at various facilities by utilizing the unique
hardware characteristics of DERs to serve as a root-of-trust.
Authentication support features of existing communication
protocols used in power grid substations typically rely on
challenge-reply sequences (CRSeqs) [14]. Such schemes assist
in verifying that all received commands within the power grid
are genuinely sent by authorized remote embedded devices.
An example of the CRSeq authentication as part of the secure
authentication extension of the distributed network protocol
(DNP3-SA, IEEE 1815-2012 std.) is shown in Fig. 1.
The functionality of DERauth is based on the concept of
CRSeq authentication making it applicable to a wide range of
industrial protocols. Instead of relying on software generated
values (e.g., message authentication codes – MACs), DERauth
leverages the physical characteristics of DER assets. Fig. 2
presents an overview of the approach within the typical com-
munication configuration between operators and DER plants.
DERauth utilizes the properties of li-ion BESS to extract
randomness using the BESS real-time state consisting of state-
of-charge (SoC) and voltage measurements. Specifically, we
(i) introduce a BESS-based self-authentication scheme for
DERs, (ii) utilize a dynamically updating process to improve
reliability and account for BESS aging and cycle-to-cycle
variations, and (iii) address modeling attacks by incorporating
BESS data into DERauth’s replies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the background and related work. Section III
describes our methodology while Section IV presents the
experimental results. Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Most industrial protocols were initially developed without
any security features, i.e., they do not support mechanisms
to ensure data integrity and confidentiality. They rely on an a
priori trusted relationship between master and slave communi-
cation devices. To overcome these pitfalls, security measures
involve software assisted wrapper functions. However, such
methods have been shown to be susceptible to a variety of
attacks since it is easy to decode the algorithm and extract
secret keys, especially if stored in the non-volatile memory of
the device [14], [15].
The proliferation of hardware-assisted security solutions
assumes that hardware can inherently be trusted as the lower
lever of abstraction, and thus contribute in reducing the attack
surface of embedded devices within industrial environments
[16]–[18]. Among them, PUFs are lightweight security struc-
tures relying on a challenge-response mechanism where for
each challenge provided as input the PUF reacts in a unique
and unpredictable (but repeatable) way. PUFs can be classified
based on their fabrication method as silicon (e.g., SRAM and
Arbiter PUFs) and non-silicon PUFs (e.g., MEMS and piezo-
sensor PUFs) [19]. Silicon PUFs, however, need to be designed
during the integrated circuit (IC) fabrication process [20], [21].
On the other hand, non-silicon PUFs require instrumentation
and quantization schemes [22], [23]. Existing solutions cannot
be integrated in industrial environments with already deployed
embedded devices and established communication protocols
since redesigning or suspending system operation can be
intolerable [24]. DERauth relies on existing infrastructure to
provide hardware-based authentication support for industrial
protocols.
Since many protocols that have been used for remote opera-
tion of industrial assets did not originally support any security
properties, and as industrial environments are less likely to
be supported by a dedicated infrastructure, such protocols
started to incorporate add-on security features. An example
is the hash-based MAC (HMAC) authentication of DNP3-SA
(Fig. 1). A DNP3 master device sends an operation request to
the outstation device which, upon receiving a critical request,
sends an authentication challenge message to the master. The
master device calculates the HMAC for the challenge and
sends it back to the outstation that computes the HMAC value
for the challenge message and compares it with the received
one. If the values match, the DNP3 outstation executes the
operation request. Despite the security mechanisms of DNP3-
SA, the protocol has still significant drawbacks such as: (i)
the utilization of HMAC-SHA-1 as its MAC algorithm that
has been proven to be cryptographically weak, and (ii) the
dependence on pseudo-RNGs (PRNGs) for its session keys in
absence of a high-entropy source [14], [25].
III. DERAUTH DESIGN
DERauth aims to address the security issues of industrial
protocols by leveraging the physical properties of DERs while
minimizing redesign efforts. We follow a similar approach
to DNP3-SA, in which the execution of an operation request
requires authentication of the outstation DER embedded device
using a CRSeq. To achieve that, we leverage the inherent
physical randomness from the BESS using SoC and voltage
measurements as the sensed physical quantities to construct
non-repeatable replies. Thus, for instance, if DERauth is
used with DNP3-SA it would alleviate the issue of relying
on PRNGs to build session keys for HMAC. In order to
address modeling attacks [26], [27], we compare the BESS
measurements of distinct batteries with their previous cycle
measurements (i.e., self-authentication) rather than performing
cell-to-cell comparisons. We also incorporate the BESS real-
time measurements in our replies to increase entropy. The
latter ensures that same challenges always result in different
replies, hence mitigating eavesdropping and packet replay
attacks. Furthermore, instead of using HMACs to validate
the integrity of exchanged data, DERauth includes a trans-
formation function that cannot only support similar HMAC
functionality but also assists in mitigating modeling attacks.
A. Threat Model
The objective of DERauth is to ensure that a control master
server, either at the DER plant management system or the
utility, is able to authenticate a DER outstation unit in the
presence of an attacker eavesdropping the communication
channel. The embedded outstation device is placed at a secure
location and can acquire real-time BESS measurements. In
addition, the master device as part of a secure energy control
facility is operated only by authorized users who enforce
security mechanisms to mitigate risks related to operational
disruptions. We consider the Dolev-Yao threat model where
any communication channel between two parties is considered
insecure after the initial handshake (enrollment) [28]. The
Dolev-Yao adversary is capable to perform man-in-the-middle
attacks and inject, eavesdrop, modify, and block messages on
the communication network in order to get authenticated. Fur-
thermore, DERauth can handle adversaries knowing protocol-
specific information. We also consider modeling attacks in
which the adversary acquires CRSeqs (e.g., by eavesdropping)
aiming to reconstruct the challenge-reply mechanism of DE-
Rauth and initiate a communication request as a trusted DER
unit.
B. Li-ion Battery Cells
Our design uses li-ion cells as an emerging energy storage
solution in BESS. However, the approach is modular in terms
of supporting other battery types at the BESS without modi-
fications to the architecture of DERauth. With respect to bat-
tery characterization and performance evaluation technologies,
electrochemical impedance spectroscopy (EIS) is widely used
to monitor changes in batteries under different usage or storage
conditions. EIS uses small-amplitude AC signals to measure
Fig. 3. Voltage and SoC variation for 20 different li-ion cells during their
first discharge cycle.
resistive and capacitive properties over a wide frequency range
[29]. Despite the popularity of EIS for the evaluation and thus
unique identification of battery cells, EIS requires the cell to be
disconnected from any load and be at steady equilibrium state.
Additionally, measuring an EIS spectrum takes time (often up
to many hours) and requires specialized equipment. Hence,
it can become prohibitively expensive if applied to multiple
cells.
In our design, considering the impracticality of EIS in real-
time applications, we perform BESS profiling using the model
of li-ion cells which is based on the cell’s real-time voltage
and SoC. The voltage describes the difference in electrical
potential between the poles of a battery. It provides the cell’s
electromotive force that changes with the SoC according to
each particular variant of the li-ion chemistry. The SoC is
the cell’s residual charge and therefore the expected operating
time. It is a percent ratio of the current battery capacity
(measured in mAh) and the rated maximum cell capacity [30].
The behavior profile of li-ion cells regarding voltage and
SoC can significantly differ as a result of the intrinsic vari-
ability caused by the manufacturing process [31]. Identical
li-ion cells manufactured at the same facility and following
the same process provide different voltage measurements at
the same SoC during their lifetime. The internal resistance,
capacitance, and electrochemical effects that cannot be fully
controlled during fabrication contribute to these deviations
[32]. Fig. 3 demonstrates the voltage and SoC discrepancies
between 20 identical li-ion cells during their first discharge
cycle. As the number of cycles increases, the voltage and SoC
variation between different cells of the same BESS, i.e., at the
same aging, will further increase. In our design, the multiple
li-ion cells constituting the BESS of the DER are leveraged
towards entropy generation, i.e., the voltage and SoC of each
battery cell are utilized towards the development of DERauth.
C. System Modules
In this section, we discuss the operating modules of DE-
Rauth. The control master server and the DER’s embedded
outstation device share a cell-reply table. The content of
the table is ephemeral and gets updated asynchronously at
Fig. 4. Layout of (a) challenge and (b) temporary reply rtemp.
Fig. 5. Cycle-to-cycle discharge variations for the same cell.
both ends without requiring secure storage. In the event of
compromise, the stored data will become obsolete the moment
that the communication round terminates. The cell-reply table
is defined as Crt = N× < ci, ri >. N is the number of
BESS cells, and ci and ri are the selected BESS cell and its
reply, respectively. The length of the cell replies, ri, depends
on the system integrator’s constraints and number of supported
BESS cells. If cell ci is authenticated, then the reply consists
of ri. Crt is initialized at the first authentication request with
pseudo-random ri values and gets modified at both ends after
every authentication request.
At the control server, a challenge builder module generates
challenges in the form of < Lset1 , Lset2 , RT > as shown
in Fig. 4(a). Lset1 is a set of BESS cells selected to be
authenticated and Lset2 is a set of cells selected to represent
the current BESS state, Bs, i.e., the real-time SoC and voltage
measurements. Lset1 is not necessarily equal to Lset2 , and the
cells contained in the two sets are arbitrarily defined by the
control server with every challenge request. The challenge also
includes the reply transformation bits, RT . These bits indicate
to the DER’s outstation device how the DERauth reply, rauth,
should be modified before being sent to the master. In our
design, RT values include shift operations and their direction
as well as bitmask data. The flexibility of DERauth allows
to modify the reply transformation scheme to favor security
requirements and effectively increase the replies randomness.
We refer to these reversible operations as the transformation
function T of RT . It allows to generate different CRSeqs for
the same pair of Lset1 and Lset2 which increases the possible
challenge-reply space preventing packet replay or modeling
attacks.
Algorithm 1: DERauth enrollment and authentication
exchange Crt
while session.valid do
challenge.send(Lset1 , Lset2 , RT )
if challenge.received then
if compare(measure(Lset1 ), DUCM) then
replies = get.reply(Lset1 , Crt)
Bs = measure(Lset2 )
rauth = transform(Bs, replies, RT )
update(Crt, Bs), send(rauth)
else abort.authentication()
end
if reply.received then
[Bs, replies] = extract(rauth)
if verify(replies, Crt) then
update(Crt, Bs), issue.controlCommand()
else abort.authentication()
end
end
At the DER outstation, there exist three main modules to
support the authentication functionality of DERauth. (i) A bat-
tery fuel gauge module which records the real-time SoC and
voltage measurements for the requested BESS cells. (ii) A dy-
namically updating characteristic cell-model (DUCM): every
BESS cell has its own unique DUCM, a dynamic database with
transient SoC measurements and their corresponding voltages
for each cell. The relationship between SoC and voltage values
is not deterministic as presented in Fig. 5. The DUCM adjusts
cycle-to-cycle and aging variations. The BESS measuring
process is constantly running on the outstation unit updating
the DUCM with the latest measurements. (iii) A reply builder
module that generates the authentication reply message rauth.
As part of this module, a temporary reply rtemp is constructed
and it consists of two parts: (a) the Bs provided by Lset2 and
used to modify the Crt in both the outstation and master,
and (b) the replies ri of cells ci from Lset1 . Finally, rauth
is transformed [rauth ≡ T (rtemp)] using the transformation
function T which can be functionally modified according to
application-specific security requirements (Section III-E).
D. System Flow
The design details and the process flow of DERauth are
presented in Algorithm 1. The overall design process includes
two phases: the enrollment phase and the authentication phase.
1) Enrollment phase: In this stage, the master server and
the DER’s embedded outstation device establish a secure com-
munication link to exchange the cell-reply table, Crt. The two
parties as in a typical power grid environment communicate
from geographically dispersed locations utilizing TCP/IP con-
nections. Protocols such as IEEE 2030.5, Modbus and DNP3
facilitate the majority of these TCP/IP links while the security
of the exchanged data is ensured by Transport Layer Security
(TLS) (Fig. 2). Based on the established communication link,
and following the guidelines of the already-in-place DER
protocol, the outstation device shares the Crt with the server.
2) Authentication phase: The master control server sends
an authentication challenge, formed by the challenge builder
module, to the DER embedded device. Once the challenge
is received, the selection of Lset1 and Lset2 occurs in ac-
cordance to the challenge layout of Fig. 4(a). With the cell
selection completed, the outstation device takes SoC and
voltage measurements of Lset1 and Lset2 using the battery
fuel gauge module. In order to authenticate Lset1 , each cell’s
real-time SoC and voltage are compared to the stored values
in its respective DUCM (self-authentication). Next, DERauth
updates Crt based on a predefined operation p[ri,Bs] between
every reply ri and BESS state Bs to avoid storing invariable
Crt data at both ends.
rauth is then generated by the reply builder module and
sent from the DER device to the master server. The server
extracts the replies ri of Lset1 and the current battery state
Bs. To achieve that, first the reverse transformation of function
T is performed according to the reverse shift and bitmask
operations within RT . Then, each cell’s ri is verified using
the master server’s Crt. The Crt at the control server is
also updated based on the p[ri,Bs] operation. The selection
of operations within p[ri,Bs] and RT can be adapted based on
the time-critical latency requirements of the industrial process
and protocol.
E. Security Discussion
In order to address man-in-the-middle (e.g., eavesdropping,
packet replay, etc.) and modeling attacks, we incorporate
within the challenge-reply mechanism of DERauth the current
BESS state measurements, Bs, and the transformation func-
tion, T . The BESS state allows to: (i) generate different replies
for the same challenges, and (ii) update the Crt after every
communication round. The inclusion of Bs within DERauth
protects against replay and rollback attempts for authentication
using old versions of rauth. The transformation function, T ,
serves as a data integrity check; any received reply – at the
master server side – has to conform to T defined when the
challenge was issued. Any modified reply will be disregarded
as counterfeit since after reversing T the data will have an
incorrect format.
According to the design of DERauth, all of the three fol-
lowing conditions are necessary for an attacker to compromise
DERauth’s operation: (i) exact knowledge of the challenge
and reply layout as well as their content representation, (ii)
the transformation function T being used, and (iii) the most
current version of the Crt. The first requirement is necessary
in order to be informed which cells are measured for the Bs
and which are authenticated against their DUCM. The second
condition is required in order to properly structure the reply
and not get rejected (as modified) from the master server.
Overall, the transformation function can be changed every time
an enrollment phase is initiated; its update frequency can be
specified by the DERauth integrator based on the security and
flexibility constraints of the monitored DER asset. The third
requirement is needed in order to provide the correct reply
values ri for the indicated Lset1 cells, else the authentication
will fail. Knowledge of the current version of Crt requires
physical access to the master server or the outstation device.
Also, since Crt gets updated after every communication round,
any previous knowledge becomes ineffective.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Design Parameters
For the implementation of DERauth we opted for 64-bit
CRSeqs. The ci and ri of Crt are selected to be 8-bit long,
and N was set to 100 by extrapolating the measurements
of multiple BESS cells. Based on the size of ci, we use in
the challenges: four cells for Lset1 and two cells for Lset2
(Fig. 4(a)). The remaining 16 bits in the challenge layout
are reserved for the reply transformation, RT . The first five
bits of RT define the number of positions that each reply
will be shifted (cyclically), the following three indicate the
direction of the shift, and the remaining eight bits are an XOR
bitmask applied to the shifted reply. We adopt bitwise logical
operations and shifts for the transformation function T as well
as the p[riBs] operation used for the Crt updating process,
ensuring that DERauth meets the stringent timing requirements
of industrial protocols such as DNP3-SA. Regarding the
replies rtemp, their first half is the Bs of Lset2 and the second
half includes the 8-bit ri of Lset1 , as shown in Fig. 4(b).
B. Implementation Setup
In order to evaluate DERauth, we have developed a proof-
of-concept implementation in which li-ion battery cells (Sam-
sung 25R 18650) are used as the BESS of DER. For the
cell discharge characterization, which provides the cell SoC
and voltage, we assume a constant load of 500 mA. This is
sufficient since DUCM constantly monitors the BESS cells and
can account for varying load conditions. For the extraction of
DUCM measurements, we use the battery evaluation module
TI EV2400 with the battery fuel gauge TI BQ34Z100EVM.
The setup provides the SoC and voltage measurements of
cells with a maximum error of ±1%. To attain the highest
possible accuracy from the battery fuel gauge, each battery
cell is subjected to a “learning cycle”. The cycle involves a
full discharge for the fuel gauge module to accurately calculate
each cell’s impedance. The setup is presented in Fig. 6.
As presented in Section III, during the authentication phase
the outstation device compares the measured SoC and voltage
for Lset1 cells with their corresponding DUCM. The DUCM
consists of the discharge measurements between voltage levels
of ∆V = 4 – 3.45 V as the nominal operating range per li-
ion cell [33]. Exceeding those limits could severely impact
the cell’s condition and performance (e.g., low capacity, poor
cycle life, high self-discharge, etc.). For example, a prolonged
low voltage may cause dissolution of metals (e.g., copper)
while a high voltage can cause battery degradation. SoC and
voltage measurements are acquired at 10 mAh intervals for
every cell. Obtaining and storing these values more frequently
(e.g., 1 mAh) has also been examined. However, this offers
(a)
(b)
Fig. 6. (a) Schematic diagram and (b) experimental measurement setup.
Fig. 7. Reliability Vs. updating interval (black) and tolerance threshold (blue).
marginal accuracy improvements while the memory footprint
increases almost tenfold. In the scenario of additional memory
constraints, the measurement voltage interval ∆V could be
further decreased, assuming the BESS is operating in the ∆V
range, without altering the operating principles of DERauth or
impacting the authentication reliability.
C. Evaluation Analysis
In this part, we present the evaluation of our implementa-
tion. We describe the procedure to ensure that cell SoC and
voltage measurements are sufficient for authenticating each li-
ion battery cell. We also discuss DUCM accuracy and present
the experimental results that illustrate the impact of the DUCM
updating frequency. In addition, we assess the resiliency of the
DERauth’s CRSeqs against machine learning attacks. We test
the CRSeqs with three different multilayer perceptron neural
networks (MLP-NN).
1) Battery model evaluation: In order to examine the
battery model and the reliability of DERauth, we measure
Sauth/Aauth×100%, where Sauth is the number of successful
authentications and Aauth is the total number of attempted
authentications for the same cell. In order to construct the
battery model, we discharged cells for 20 cycles. Fig. 5 shows
that, even for the same cell, discharge curves vary from
cycle-to-cycle depending on inherent battery features (e.g.,
electrochemical properties, resistance, capacitance, process
variations, etc.), or exogenous causes such as the the cell’s
operating temperature, the type of load connected to the cell,
aging effects, state of health, etc. A static battery model
(e.g., Randle’s circuit) could not address the time varying
characteristics of the cells [34]. DUCM is constantly polling
the SoC and voltage of every cell and contributes to an updated
cell model.
Towards addressing the cycle-to-cycle discharge variation,
we define a tolerance threshold (τ ) representing the difference
between real-time state of Lset1 and DUCM. The blue curve
of Fig. 7 shows how the selection of τ affects the reliability
of the cell authentication before the deployment of DUCM. A
higher threshold could result in efficiently self-authenticating
the cells under test due to the smaller disparity between the
cells’ real-time measurements and their corresponding model
when compared against τ . As the threshold increases, although
we can reliably self-authenticate any requested cell, we can
also have many false positives, i.e., cells at similar SoC and
voltage values (cell model), which could get authenticated
if the discrepancy between their model and the real-time
measurements is less than τ . This could allow adversaries
to acquire cell replies, ri. DUCM minimizes τ to 1 mAh
while authenticating the defined cells with reliability of 90%,
eliminating the false-positives issue. DUCM achieves that by
updating the model of each cell – to account for the offset
between previous cycles and aging over the cell’s lifetime –
keeping it always below the tight threshold τ .
Fig. 5 presents the difference in discharge graphs between
20 discharge cycles. Without DUCM, the cell model would
be identical to the first discharge cycle (cycle 1), thus real-
time and cell model values would significantly differ over
time. This is presented in Fig. 8(a). DUCM can eliminate
the cycle-to-cycle discrepancy as illustrated in Fig. 8(b). The
DUCM accurately tracks the transient discharge behavior of
every cell and addresses the cycle-to-cycle variations. We
further examine DUCM reliability with 10k measurements
taken every 2 secs (measurement cycle). Fig. 7 illustrates
how the updating interval of DUCM affects authentication
reliability. For example, if the cell model is updated every
1, 000 measurements (10 times in 10k measurements) the
authentication reliability is 89.92%.
2) System Evaluation: Physical system variations can be
utilized for lightweight authentication protocols used by
resource-constrained platforms. However, the challenge-reply
(a)
(b)
Fig. 8. Cell real-time Vs. cell model discharge behavior. (a) without the
dynamically updating characteristic cell-model (DUCM), and (b) with DUCM.
mapping could be predicted if a number of CRSeqs is avail-
able. For instance, prediction accuracy that exceeds 90% with a
small number (in the range of a few thousands) of CRSeqs has
been reported [27]. In order to evaluate DERauth against such
modeling attacks resulting from machine learning, we provide
a set of CRSeqs to a MLP configuration [35]. Increasing
the number of MLP layers creates well-defined relationships
between inputs and outputs improving the learning efficacy of
the algorithm. In our case, three different network architectures
are utilized. Their best prediction results are achieved with a
dataset of 100k CRSeqs. The 100k CRSeqs are generated in
Python as part of the challenge-reply protocol implementation.
As for the entropy of CRSeqs, we utilize real-time battery
voltages and SoC values collected by our experimental setup.
Different sizes of hidden layers are used in order to enhance
the learning rate of the machine learning modeling attacks. A
grid search is also performed to fine-tune the hyperparameters
of the MLPs. In Table I, we provide results for the three MLP-
NN architectures with different batch sizes for the training
stage of the MLP-NN.
We train the configurations of the MLP-NN algorithms
using different dataset sizes ranging from 1k to 100k CRSeqs
and a 20% validation split. The 64-bit CRSeqs emulate the
behavior of DERauth in a real-world scenario. The machine
learning attack model is tested on generated sets using the
same procedure. Our results indicate that increased number
of available CRSeqs (> 10k) has minor improvements in
prediction accuracy. This emphasizes the robustness of our
proof-of-concept. Ideally, the accuracy should be 50% (com-
TABLE I
MLP NEURAL NETWORK PERFORMANCE WITH 100K CRSEQS.
Network Batch Validation Prediction
Architecture size accuracy accuracy
64− 320− 128− 64− 64 32 81.50% 81.46%
64− 320− 128− 64 32 81.90% 80.93%
64− 64− 64− 64 64 71.47% 71.26%
Fig. 9. Prediction accuracy Vs. known CRSeqs datasets.
plete randomness). In our experiments, the MLP never exceeds
accuracy levels of ≈ 82% despite increasing the size of the
CRSeq training set. This level could be further decreased using
longer CRSeqs (e.g., 128-bit) able to incorporate higher BESS
entropy (more cell replies ri and Bs measurements). The
results showing the prediction accuracy for the three different
configurations of MLP networks are depicted in Fig. 9.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents DERauth, a proof-of-concept hardware
authentication framework for DERs in power grids using li-
ion battery cells. This prototype version shows the potential
of leveraging existing hardware to authenticate BESS-based
DER systems. Thus, DERauth can serve as an add-on feature
in existing industrial DER protocols. We have developed a
dynamic process to update the BESS state and evaluate our
model using MLP-NN. Building an ecosystem for a scalable
and modular design will be included in our future work. Our
research will incorporate a formal security analysis, fuzzy
extractor error correction techniques, hardware-in-the-loop ex-
periments, investigation of longer CRSeqs to explore trade-offs
between security, performance and storage overhead, and vari-
able loads to simulate cells discharge behavior. Furthermore,
we will develop the required application program interface
(API) which will enable the integration of our authentication
framework into existing communication protocol standards
(e.g., DNP3, IEEE 2030.5, etc.) used for issuing commands
between aggregators and DER devices.
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